Tag Archives: Senate Bill
Cable news is jammed with horrific stories of widespread destruction and disarray caused by an unpredictable calamity that struck with sudden, unstoppable force, thrusting many who were already sorely beleaguered into chaos and desperate disarray. Hurried rescue missions failed to prevent widespread pain and suffering. Such is life for the Democrats following the Massachusetts special election. Tip O’Neill was misquoted. All politics is loco. The big question now is whether the Mass. disaster presages a mass disaster for the Dems come November.
Health-reform bookmakers currently favor the Senate bill over the House version as bicameral, unipartisan, unconference-committee participants conspire in a C-Span-free White House to extrude their secret sausage. One of many unfortunate consequences of the Senate bill—according to a new report from the government’s own Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—is likely to be a significant shrinkage in the ranks of medical providers willing or able to treat Medicare patients. The Senate’s proposal to insure the uninsured would require Medicare benefit cuts of $541 billion to pay the lion’s share of health reform’s $882 billion ten-year cost. CMS projects that fully 20% of doctors and hospitals participating in Medicare’s Part A inpatient benefit program will become unprofitable as a result. According to CMS’ chief actuary Richard Foster, “Providers for whom Medicare constitutes a substantive portion of their business could find it difficult to remain profitable and, absent legislative intervention, might end their participation in the program (possibly jeopardizing access to care for beneficiaries).”
WE DON’T NEED AN INDIVIDUAL MANDATE TO BUY HEALTH INSURANCE: PART 2 – WHAT THE SENATE AND HOUSE BILLS MISS
People will game any economic system for their own benefit—whether medical care or anything else. It is this characteristic human behavior that makes markets thrive while assuring that no alternative, centrally-controlled mechanism will ever match markets’ ability to optimize the creation and distribution of economic goods. The necessary rules and top-down decisions that govern centralized systems can never be sufficiently detailed or flexible to match markets’ indescribably complex and dynamic interactions among millions of consumers, producers, and intermediaries—each gaming the system for his own advantage. No one really understands why this emergent property of human behavior works, but it does.
Thus, we should always seek minimally regulated market solutions for creating and distributing economic goods, even—or especially—in the presence of market failure. Accordingly, enacting health reform to correct the health insurance market failure requires setting up a new regulatory and safety-net framework that reforms the system to allow everyone to purchase (or not) affordable individual insurance while preventing people from killing the market with free-riding adverse selection.